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THE ORIGINS OF A COERCIVE LABOUR SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA
1890-1933
Marian Lacey
There is another awful branch of this bad law,
that a native is not allowed to hire a white's
farm by money, except by working for nothing,
'Boroko'.l
This paper provides a re-interpretation of a crucial
period in South African history, during which the main
struts of the Apartheid State were laid. There were four
major issues facing successive governments in the first
two decades after Union in 1910- The first was how to
inhibit further the growth of an independent African
peasantry2 so as to force all Africans to become migrant
workers dependent on the wage sector for their survival.
The second, linked to the first, was where to settle
African share-croppers, half-share farmers and cash tenants
said to be squatting illegally on white-owned farms.
These issues underlay the debate between the two main
capitalist sectors, mines and farms. For the State, the
insistent theme of successive policies was how to share
labour evenly between these two sectors, the aim being to
enserf an adequate number of independent peasants to the
farmers while ensuring that enough Africans still had a
subsistence base so that a good supply could be kept
oscillating between the reserves and the mine compounds.3
The third issue was the mass influx of Africans to the
towns, which created a new and urgent problem for the
State, one which reached crisis point in the early 1920s.
The labour shortage in the primary sectors (mines and
farms) was aggravated by the entry of secondary industry
as a strong competitor for labour, especially after the
boost to local industries provided by the Great War. On
the labour.front, it was an unquiet, convulsive epoch.
Strikes, countrywide uprisings and passive resistance
campaigns culminated in a strike by 42,000 Africans in ...
early 1920 and the Rand Revolt of 1922 which forced the
State into drastic action. There was intense debate on
the ultimate fate of urban Africans. Businessmen, backed
by liberal free-market economists, argued that'the market
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With the change of regime in 1924 the NP's politically
powerful rural electorate got the upper hand in labour
matters. The party seized the chance to make major
revisions in their predecessor's land policy and so boost
the farm labour supply. As in the old Boer republics, the
farmers opposed land being reserved for Africans, arguing
that this provided a refuge for Africans resisting farm
work. In place of the proposals to resettle squatters on
reserve land they wanted to enserf the independent tenants
to meet the farm labour shortage. They therefore demanded
that the State outlaw contractual arrangements which
allowed African peasants to hire or lease land from
absentee landlords and land companies, and enforce their
immediate eviction for redistribution among the farmers.11
So with the NP coming to power the legal segregation of
the two races was affirmed, but the reserve policy for the
Orange Free State (OFS) and Transvaal was abandoned. This
meant that the six percent of South Africa's total land was
allocated as extra land did not materialise. Only the
seven percent of land already allocated was kept as
schedule reserves, and these were concentrated in Natal
and the Cape where the largest reserves already existed.
Outside those areas Africans were forbidden to hire or even
own land, and they could not lease land either unless they
tied themselves to a three-month labour tenancy contract.
The NP hoped this would block the escape of rentier tenants
('squatters1) from labour tenancy terms which they would
ordinarily have rejected. Africans could not flee to the
reserves because without the extra land there was no room
for them, particularly as many had herds of cattle. The
idea that Afrikaners masterminded the reserve policy (or
homelands policy, in today's terms) in pursuit of some
racist ideology is therefore wrong. They wanted to keep
Africans in the white rural areas as farm labourers. Land
segregation as it had been planned - resettling all
Africans except bona fide full-time servants and five
labour tenant families for each farmer- was a dead letter
for the NP.
The traditional view on the African disenfranchisement
debate has been that the NP abolished the Cape African vote
because whites at that time feared they would eventually
be 'swamped at the polls1.12 Contrary to this the Cape
vote was abolished so that all Africans could be reduced
to a super-exploitable condition. Cape African voters had
access to political power, and property and union rights.
Clearly they were less vulnerable to exploitation.
Paradoxically, even though the reserve policy was first
launched in the Cape, the property qualification for the
vote made strict legal segregation of the races
"inoperative there so that none of the restrictions and
controls that went with it could apply either".rsThe
right to buy land anywhere in the Cape meant that all Cape
Africans, and not only voters, were less controllable.
Legal segregation had to be extended to the Cape if
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Africans there were to be kept like their Northern counter-
parts as a permanently underprivileged exploitable class,
under virtually totalitarian control. This, it is argued,
is mainly why the Hertzog regime in collaboration with the
SAP moved to disenfranchise a mere 10,000 African, voters
who made up no more than 1.4 percent of the voting
population.
The Cape vote prevented the State from extending the
same system of administrative control throughout the
country - another reason why Hertzog insisted the Cape vote
must go. A centralised and uniform system of control had
to be set up to streamline and regulate the labour flow
among the various sectors. In 1924 the State still had
the four different systems that had evolved in the four -
States before Union. White settlers everywhere had all
but destroyed the pre-colonial tribal groupings and 'tribal'
system by seizing the land and with it the basis of
'tribalism' - the common land, and the chiefs as trustees
of that common land. Thereafter in the Cape direct rule
had been imposed for better control of Africans in the
areas they still held, called reserves. In the Transvaal
and OFS, where Africans had been almost completely stripped
of their land, a blatant master-servant system prevailed
after the followers of conquered and dispossessed chiefs
had been scattered among the farmers. Only in Natal were
there vestiges of 'tribalism' left, an effect of
Shepstone's policy of indirect rule.
We shall also see that one of the most significant acts
of the Pact government was to insist on a policy of
enforced tribalisation based on the Natal system. This
meant refurbishing a hybrid traditionalism and creating
tribal authorities who would be directly responsible to
the supreme authority of the Native Department (NAD). The
NAD's powers were enlarged in turn so that it began working
as a State within a State with the executive right to rule
by proclamation.
But the NAD could command only the scheduled reserves
and areas that had been specifically proclaimed African.
This excluded the 300,000 or so families (1.5 million
souls) on land rented from farmers and absentee landlords.
So the State finally extended its control over this group
too. The Pact regime moved to tie down these so-called
'squatters' to the farmers for six months' compulsory
labour service in every year. Here the NP's overall idea
was to stabilise the labour tenancy system by a pre-
emptive move to oust the SAP plan of resettling 'squatters'
in the reserve. Hertzog's waiving of the reserve policy
can really only be understood in terms of his determina-
tion to enserf half the rural population to the farmers
and in that way prevent the other capitalist sectors from
disrupting the farm labour supply.
Some recent researches have failed to appreciate this.
They focus on the central importance of mining and argue
that it had a unique role in shaping South Africa's
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labour relations through the extension of the migrant
labour system to all sectors.15 Yet in the Transvaal and
the OFS the reserve policy hardly functioned at all16
before the trusteeship policy in 1936, and even in the
Cape and Natal it was very indifferently run. The main
thrust of State policy was to divide the labour force for
the exclusive use of one sector or another. So for example,
until the mid-fifties or even later the idea was to tie
farm workers firmly to the farmers by binding them as
labour tenants in the white rural areas. The mines'
supply, the State said, could be drawn mainly from the
large reserves in the Cape if the Africans there could
only be properly controlled. Hence mine recruitment was
banned in certain areas, as will be shown.17 The Cape
force was to be supplemented by indentured workers mainly
from Mozambique but also from the High Commission terri-
tories. The whole idea was to avoid intersector compe-
tition by having as few common recruitment areas as
possible, because any rivalry would drive wages up all
round. .
It remains true that migrant labour was the cheapest
and migrant workers the most vulnerable to exploitation.
The semi-proletarianised status of the mines' labour force
made it possible for the migrant's family to support
itself in the reserves. Mining capital, and to a large
extent industrial capital as well,was thus able to set the
wages of its labour at the level of a 'single' worker,
excluding the material needs of the family. The creation
and maintenance of this migrant labour force, the mines
claimed, was crucial to their continued profitability. The
mines were threatened by Pact government's decision to
abandon the reserve policy, and also by the question of the
State's inability to extend the segregation controls to
the Cape - for the mines' Cape recruitment had outstripped
even the Mozambique supply and so it became imperative that
the flow of labour from the Cape be strictly regulated.
But as one government after another failed to grant
extra land for the reserves, these areas declined to the
point where people fled from them to survive. To begin
with, Africans did all they could to stake their claim
in the reserves and those who succeeded clung to their land
as the only hope of even fragmentary security and
independence. But many thousands more failed. Either they
had to live precariously as flotsam with no land of their
own or they left the reserves permanently and moved with
their families to the towns. This, and the State's
prevarication about using strict influx control to curb
African urbanisation, had hastened the collapse of the
migrant labour system, the mines claimed.
Moreover it was said that this uncontrolled influx of
Africans was responsible for the mass unemployment of poor
whites in the town. One of the most important parts of
the Pact regime's strategy was the State system of job
colour bars which it introduced mainly in response to
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the 1922 strike. The key to this system is that it aimed
to remove whites from the working class.19 This was to
be done by dividing the working class into 'civilized1
whites and super-exploitable Africans. Unskilled whites
would then be pushed into government-controlled jobs and
State-run institutions while those with ability were to
be trained for higher skilled jobs. To bring this about,
the State took over wage determination for unskilled
workers. Furthermore, while African workers were segre-
gated and kept as degraded workers in their locations,
whites in their segregated areas were to be 'uplifted1
through sub-economic housing schemes, schools, welfare
and recreational amenities - all in an attempt to upgrade
poor whites and improve their 'quality of life'.
This was not done in pursuit of any racist ideology. In
time, as the State was well aware, economic disparity would
create its own apartheid. Although not an invention of
capitalism, racism was the consequence of a deliberate
State strategy geared to ensure the efficient exploitation
of 80 percent of the work force which in South Africa
happened to be black. The colour was fortuitous for
capital.
So, contrary to what liberal free-market economists
have said, State-induced job reservation made sense
economically. Not only did it allow for the ongoing
super-exploitation of the mass of the work force which
marginal mines and sub-economic industries and farms
claimed was essential for their profitability, but it was
also a rational response by the State to accommodate the
changing needs of the South African economy. As early as
the 1920s smaller individually owned industries were being
replaced by larger highly capitalised monopoly industries,
and with this concentration of capital firms became more
mechanised. If poor whites were given the right kind of
training, the State argued, they could be assigned to the
semi-skilled operative jobs, reserving the menial low-paid
jobs for Africans. Capital would gain by having ultra-
cheap African labour available. It would also gain because
mechanised industries would reap the benefits of cheaper
labour by deskilling jobs.
Above all, said the State, a white labour preference
policy could be used to buy the loyalty of white workers
for the capitalist form of State, especially if they were
upgraded to the point where they were no longer susceptible
to identification with the African working class and
joined the exploiting class instead.
The success of this policy lay not only in 'uplifting',
the proportionately small group of white workers but in
finding a way to keep the entire African working class
down - "in their place", in South African parlance. The
State set about isolating Africans at every level. They
were isolated physically in encampments called locations
for political and military control. They they were
isolated from the local and world movements by being
denied trade union rights. Later on an anti-education
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policy isolated Africans psychologically and linguistically
and was designed to create a self-fulfilling prophecy that
Africans would not be equal to whites. All this together
with their sub-subsistence wages would eventually stunt the
Africans' physical and mental growth so that they really
would be best fitted for manual and menial jobs.20 If
Africans actually seemed inferior, exploitation by whites
would then appear more justified.
To keep Africans 'in their place', furthermore, the
State had to set up repressive and controlling apparatuses.
There had to be a centralised system of State control over
labour allocation and distribution, of the kind the mines
had for their recruitment and compound quarters. That and
the policy of isolating Africans led to the segregated
African locations being created. From the 1920s onwards
more and more attention was paid to State control of the
African influx to towns, to prevent inter-sector
competitions and distribute labour more evenly, but even
into the early 1930s whites hotly debated how far the State
should have control and how far the influx should be
curtailed. It all centred on what to do with 'surplus' or
'redundant' Africans in town.21 This 'surplus' was needed
in other sectors, yet manufacturers fought to keep this
labour in town because it helped to depress wages. At
first State policy was against limiting African influx -
in the 1920s, when Hertzog stepped up the policy of economic
nationalism to break the stranglehold of foreign capital.
He was determined to boost local sub-economic industry, and
cheap labour was particularly vital for these marginal
enterprises. His government thus hesitated to interfere
much with the flow of Africans from the reserves to towns,
as this might create an artificial labour shortage and push
wages up. However, they did tighten restrictions against
the employment of so-called 'illegals' who had deserted from
the mines and farms, and ordered them to be endorsed out of
town.
This in broad outline sketches the main steps taken by
the Hertzog regime to reduce Africans to super-exploitable
proportions. But by 1932 it still had not managed to settle
the conflict between mines and farms over whether there
should be reserve policy or simply legal segregation. This
stalling on policy hastened the collapse of the migrant
labour system and so was seen as disastrous for the mines -
especially as the Pact had failed to get proper influx
controls going.
Yet mining and mining surpluses were of central impor-
tance, for on them depended the State's capitalisation
programme to boost farming and local industry. This forced
the NP to negotiate a settlement more favourable to the
mines. Besides, with the depression it became very clear
that whites had to choose; either they could fight each
other as they did in the Anglo-Boer War and again in the
1914 rebellion, and go under in the face of the 80 percent
African population, or they could sort out their differences
and reach an agreement. There was only one real choice.
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The early tensions and conflicts amongst whites had to be
smoothed over and eliminated - between Afrikaners and
Englishmen, for example, and between political parties, and
above all between capitalists and the white working class -
the time-bomb which exploded in the strike of 1922 when
whites shot whites.
The ruling classes-Opted by 1932 for a compromise
solution, as they had done in 1909 with the setting up of
the National Convention. By 1931 the decision was clear:
all parties agreed on Cape African disenfranchisement;
Stallardism for the urban areas; extending the reserves and
systematically conserving them. The last divisive issue
among whites thereafter was not to redistribute the
country's surplus so that the stranglehold of foreign
capital on the South African economy could be broken and
Afrikaners gain a share in the enormous national wealth
still mainly monopolised by English capital. Apart from
struggles and debates in that area, the whites by 1932
stood united before the mass of the African population -
totally, solidly and cohesively. Their gathering on a non-
party basis in the closed confines of the all-party 1930-2
Joint Select Committee produced the trusteeship solution.
The Cape reserve policy was extended to the Transvaal and
the Orange Free State, and legal segregation was finally
implemented in the Cape with the abolition of the Cape
franchise: gleischschaltung, total co-ordination of Union
policies, had been achieved. This common agreement and
acceptance of a compromise solution by 1932 made coalition
of the two main political parties, following the crisis at
the time South Africa abandoned the gold standard in
December 19 32, possible. The SAP-NP opposition was over.
This was soon to be followed by Fusion in 1934 and the
unfolding of the exploitative trusteeship plan. With its
implementation, by 1937 the main struts of the modern
Apartheid State had come into being.
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NOTES
1. Minutes of evidence. Eastern Transvaal Natives Land
Committee, letter from Filipus Bopape to the sub-
Native Commissioner at Pietersburg, 23 November 1917
quoted by T. Karis and G.M. Carter, eds., From Protest
to challenge: A documentary history of African politics
in South Africa, Vol. I: Protest and hope 1882-1934,
Doc 27c, 92. This paper is from the introduction of
my book: Boroko: The Origins of a Coercive Labour
System in South Africa (Johannesburg 1981).
2. Recent researchers studying the response of African
producers to markets created during the colonial
penetration of Southern Africa have shown that these
peasants responded positively to market forces and by
the late 19th century were producing substantial sur-
pluses. But then mineral discoveries heralded new
pressures for labour and there were deliberate attempts
to undermine the position of independent peasant
producers. See C. Bundy, 'The emergence and decline
of a South African peasantry1, African Affairs» 71,
285 (1972), 369-388, and 'The Transkei peasantry, c
1890-1914: Passing through a period of stress1 in
R. Palmer and N. Parson, eds., The Roots of Rural
Poverty in Central and Southern Africa^ 201-220.
Although as Bundy argues, peasants were under severe
pressure by 1913, Monica Wilson says peasant production
continued in some areas until 1930; see M. Wilson,
'Growth of peasant communites1 in M. Wilson and L.M.
Thompson, eds., The Oxford History of South Africa,
Vol. 2: South Africa 1870-1966, 56. From my recent
fieldwork in the Keiskammahoek and Victoria East
districts there is evidence to confirm Professor
Wilson's view that freeholders in these areas were
able to resist wage labour until the devastating
drought in the 1930s. But sons were encouraged to
enter the wage sectors so that family he'rds; and .
implements could be bought, and after 1930 moneys
remitted were spent increasingly on buying food. In
surveyed quitrent areas in the Ciskei few families
were able to subsist from production alone after 1913.
3. Contrary to Trapido's argument that an alliance between
'maize*, and 'gold1 existed from 1907 onwards, I argue
that these two sectors rivalled each other over labour
supplies and this led to conflict.. Furthermore, their
clash was one of the main reasons for the Orange Free
State farmers breaking away to form the National Party
in 1914. The decision by all parties to bury their
differences temporarily in 1907 was certainly through
wanting to reach a common labour policy, but this was
not feasible until 1932. See S. Trapido, 'South Africa
in a comparative study of industrialisation1, Journal
of Development Studies^ 7 (April 1971), 309 ff, and
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11. Most land company owners owned or had shares in mines.
For instance, of the Corner House group of companies
(Wernher Beit & Eckstein; Rand Mines; the Central
Mining Investment Corporation and its associated
Transvaal Consolidated Land & Exploration Co.) A.P.
Cartwright wrote: 'that apart from gold mines the
group controlled, and its large interest in De Beers
and the Diamond Syndicate,, it was the biggest land-
owner in the country, for through the Transvaal
Consolidated Land and Exploration Company (TCL), it
controlled some 2,400,000 acres', Golden Age: The
story of the industrialisation of South Africa and
the part -played in it by the Corner House group of
companies, 17. In my unpublished MA thesis I analyse
evidence to show that there was an intimate relation-
ship between ownership and control of the largest
registered land companies by different mining houses.
No empirical study, it seems, has yet been done on the
nature of this association, but this preliminary
investigation shows that as long as the land companies
could enjoy a monopoly over this source of labour,
'they resisted State attempts to outlaw squatting1,
Lacey, 'Land, Labour ..', chapter 4.
12. White fear of black majority rule or the fear of
whites being 'swamped at the poll1 is a view so
entrenched in South African historiography and white
politicking that it was felt necessary to re-examine
the whole debate in detail. The view that the Cape
Africans were deprived of the vote so that they could
be reduced to super-exploitable proportions and
controlled in the same way as their northern counter-
parts is analysed in Lacey, Borokoy chapters 3, 6 and
7. Chapter 2 focuses more on the fallacies of
traditional theories.
13. The legal implications of the segregation policy and
inoperation in the Cape reserves is examined in Lacey,
Boroko, chapter 3.
14. The SAP's initial tactical resistance to the abolitic-n
of the Cape African franchise is fully examined in the
concluding chapter. Contrary to the view of liberal
writers it is argued that most SAP members were right
behind Hertzog in demanding the abolition of the Cape
vote.
15. Wolpe focuses on the economic function of the
reserves as a source of cheap migrant labour.
Legassick takes Wolpe's thesis a stage further by
showing that from the reserves the State could
redirect and reallocate the labour supply between the
two dominant sectors of capital - 'gold1 and 'maize1.
Here it is argued that the migrant labour system
which functioned through reliance on the reserves
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21. In the concluding chapter of Lacey, Boroko, the way
in which liberal writers have misrepresented the
segregationist/integrationist conflict between the
dominant classes by generalising capital's demands
for or against influx control is discussed. In this
context see also M. Morris, 'Apartheid, agriculture
and the State: The farm labour question1, Southern
Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, 8
(July 1977).
